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Scientific Evidence as Foreign Law 
Edward K. Cheng† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In his dissent in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Chief Justice Rehnquist appeared skeptical 
as to whether federal judges could fulfill the gatekeeping role 
that the majority had constructed in its watershed opinion.1 In 
a sense, Margaret Berger’s defining contribution to the 
evidence world since Daubert has been to prove Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrong. Her unflagging commitment to promoting 
science education for judges, whether through her Science for 
Judges program, her work on the Reference Manual for 
Scientific Evidence, or her work with the National Academy of 
Sciences, has set a shining example of how academic efforts can 
help solve, or at least positively impact, real world problems. 
The occasion to write for this festschrift in celebration of 
my colleague, friend, and mentor thus seemed to cry out for a 
contribution that encompassed both of these attributes: a topic 
that involved science and judging, as well as one that held 
academic interest yet had practical implications. I hope that 
the following succeeds in this regard, but even if it does, I can 
take only partial credit, for its success would be through 
following Margaret’s example. 
Most contemporary debates about scientific evidence 
focus on admissibility under Daubert and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. That bias is quite understandable—after all, it is the 
framework imposed by the United States Supreme Court. 
Daubert, however, rests on a fundamental assumption: that 
courts should treat scientific facts like any other adjudicative 
facts ultimately left to the jury. Perhaps the involvement of 
  
 † Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to Elissa Berger and Robin 
Effron for helpful suggestions, and to LaToya Best for diligent research assistance. 
Generous support was provided by the Brooklyn Dean’s Summer Research Fund. 
 1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 600 (1993) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting) (“I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges; but I am at a 
loss to know what is meant when it is said that the scientific status of a theory depends 
on its ‘falsifiability,’ and I suspect some of them will be, too.”). 
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specialized knowledge requires judges to act as gatekeepers to 
ensure some basic level of reliability, but under Daubert, 
scientific facts are still just facts.  
As I will argue, scientific facts fit awkwardly into the 
conventional framework for conceptualizing and regulating the 
proof of adjudicative facts. For one thing, scientific facts are 
rarely ever unique to the case at hand. They are instead often 
applicable to a variety of cases, and thus ideally should be 
decided uniformly. At the same time, proof of scientific facts 
generally depends on an entire body of knowledge, rather than 
a specific witness or piece of physical evidence. These 
attributes as well as others suggest that we should think 
carefully about the framework for scientific factfinding.  
Consequently, in this contribution, I look not at how 
Daubert does or should operate, but rather how the legal 
system should treat scientific facts more fundamentally. In 
particular, I suggest that proving scientific facts has much in 
common with proving foreign law. This perspective shift could 
prove fruitful for understanding and addressing many of the 
problems in scientific evidence today. More importantly, the 
procedural mechanisms developed by conflicts-of-law scholars 
to handle proof of foreign law can be adapted to the scientific 
evidence context. 
II. FACTUAL FRAMEWORKS 
A. The Law-Fact Distinction 
Lawyers are intimately familiar with the law-fact 
distinction and the many implications the dichotomy entails. 
Perhaps law and fact are not theoretically distinct,2 but in 
practice, the distinction makes all the difference. Consider the 
implications of labeling an issue as a fact question. In an 
ordinary trial, the jury is the decisionmaker for facts, and the 
rules of evidence govern the process of proof.3 Adversarial 
  
 2 See Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact 
Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1769-70 (2003) (arguing that laws and facts have 
no “essential difference,” and that the distinction is rather a function of pragmatic 
considerations such as the identity of the factfinder and whether the fact has general 
or specific import).  
 3 Conventionally, the rules of evidence govern only jury trials, with judges in 
bench trials empowered to give erstwhile inadmissible evidence whatever weight they 
feel fit. For an insightful article about why judges may also benefit from a rule-based 
evidentiary framework, see Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of 
Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165 (2006). 
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system values are also in full swing, with both the judge and 
the jury assuming a largely passive role. Factfinders ideally 
have no preexisting knowledge of any litigation-specific facts, 
and independent research is strictly prohibited.4 After trial, 
reviewing courts treat factual findings with the highest 
deference, but although such findings are binding on the 
parties through res judicata, there is no stare decisis per se—
later parties in other trials are free to relitigate the issues.5  
The process of finding law operates in sharp contrast. 
Judges determine the law. They are supposed to know the law,6 
and in many instances, judges independently research relevant 
law and legal theory, unencumbered by any rules of proof.7 
After trial, appellate courts treat lower court legal 
determinations with no deference at all. However, stare decisis 
will bind future parties to the legal decisions made in the 
present case, in part because law is neither party-specific nor 
“owned” by the parties, but rather is part of a broader scheme 
of justice with implications that go beyond the present case.8 
B. Tensions 
Despite its popularity and practical usefulness, the law-
fact distinction is hardly a clean one. Over the years, various 
  
 4 E.g., Michael B. Mushlin, Bound and Gagged: The Peculiar Predicament of 
Professional Jurors, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 239, 241-42 (2007) (discussing the 
tension between jury decisions based only on presented evidence and the background 
experience that jurors inevitably bring into the deliberation room); Laura A. Caldwell 
& Kimberly A. Wilkins, The Jailed Juror and Other Tales of Juror Misconduct: Is 
Reform Required in Illinois?, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 379, 393-96 (2001) (recounting a 
series of Illinois cases of juror misconduct involving extrarecord research). 
 5 Traditional rules requiring mutuality for issue preclusion to operate have 
of course been abandoned. 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4464 (2d ed. 2009). However, imposition of “nonmutual preclusion is . . . 
allowed only if ‘the party against whom an estoppel is asserted had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate’ in the first action,” id. (quoting Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. 
of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971)), and offensive nonmutual preclusion is permitted 
only if the trial court determines such imposition to be fair, id. (citing Parklane Hosiery 
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979)). 
 6 As the Latin phrase goes, jura novit curia, or “the court knows the law.” 
 7 See generally Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 
461-67 (2009) (discussing, among other things, the ability of courts to raise 
jurisdictional issues or “extraordinary” merits issues sua sponte). 
 8 See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26-27 
(1994) (“Judicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal 
community as a whole. They are not merely the property of private litigants and should 
stand unless a court concludes that the public interest would be served by a vacatur.” 
(quoting Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 40 
(1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting))). 
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“hybrid” issues have surfaced that fit uncomfortably into the 
dichotomy and expose its tensions. For example, as Kenneth 
Culp Davis noted long ago, the category of facts subdivides 
between adjudicative facts, which are facts in the traditional 
sense, and legislative facts, which courts use to interpret or 
develop the law.9 While adjudicative facts may be appropriately 
subject to the usual strictures, legislative facts, being part of 
legal inquiry and the judicial realm, should and do face fewer 
restrictions. Indeed, building on Davis’s distinction, John 
Monahan and Laurens Walker have argued that social science 
research, a species of legislative fact, should be treated akin to 
“legal precedent under the common law.”10 
Another orphan of the law-fact regime is foreign law. 
Here, I am not referencing the contemporary constitutional 
controversy, which asks whether American courts may 
legitimately use foreign laws as persuasive or moral authority 
in interpreting the Constitution.11 Instead, the relevant foreign 
law problem for our purposes is the more pedestrian one of how 
to prove the content of foreign law. In today’s globalized world, 
courts commonly encounter cases that are governed by the laws 
of another jurisdiction. The problem becomes how courts 
determine what French law or Chinese law says about the 
matter at hand.12  
  
 9 Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the 
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-04 (1942). 
 10 John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, 
Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 485-88 
(1986). 
 11 Compare, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-79 (2005) (discussing 
global trends in capital punishment for juvenile offenders), and id. at 604-05 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the Court has consistently referred to foreign 
and international law as relevant to its assessment of evolving standards of decency”), 
with id. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting the idea of using foreign law). A sizable 
literature on the issue of foreign and international law in constitutional 
jurisprudence—too voluminous to catalog here—has developed in the wake of Roper 
and other cases.  
 12 See generally Aurora Bewicke, The Court’s Duty to Conduct Independent 
Research into Chinese Law: A Look at Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 and Beyond, 
1 CHINESE L. & POL’Y REV. 97 (2005) (reporting recent cases involving the application 
of foreign law). Some courts evade the foreign law problem altogether by simply 
applying the law of the forum, a practice that commentators have criticized. See, e.g., 
Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(suggesting that applying the law of the forum is permissible, even if technically 
incorrect under choice-of-law rules, if neither party objects); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
CONFLICTS OF LAW § 136 cmt. h (1971) (“When both parties have failed to prove the 
foreign law, the forum may say that the parties have acquiesced in the application of 
the local law of the forum.”); Roger J. Miner, The Reception of Foreign Law in the U.S. 
Federal Courts, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 581, 583 (1995) (criticizing the practice of ignoring 
foreign law and simply applying the convenient law of the forum).  
2010] SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AS FOREIGN LAW 1099 
One may be tempted to treat foreign law no differently 
than the law of the forum—after all, law is law. But a 
moment’s reflection reveals the problem to be trickier than it 
would seem at first glance. Unlike in the case of domestic law, 
the judge in a foreign law case does not bring a lifetime of 
experience and expertise to the task.13 The relevant statutory 
and case materials are likely in another language and out of an 
entirely different legal tradition.14 The judge will therefore need 
the help of some type of factfinding process, most often through 
an expert provided by the parties or appointed by the court. 
Questions about scientific facts present similar 
problems.15 Although they are treated as facts, general 
scientific facts, such as whether a scientific method like DNA 
typing is valid, or whether a substance causes cancer, fit poorly 
into the ordinary factual framework. The proof process for facts 
is built largely around the assumption that fact determinations 
are specific to the case. Usually, this perspective makes sense, 
because adjudicative facts are of little interest beyond the 
litigants at bar. No other institution will ever have more 
information or be better equipped than the jury to decide a 
factual issue. Second-guessing the jury only creates 
inefficiency. 
Scientific facts, however, are different. Being general 
truths, they ideally should apply consistently from one case to 
another.16 In addition, scientific facts are easily subject to 
external scrutiny. Unlike ordinary facts, in which no one is the 
wiser, with scientific facts, whole communities of scientists 
stand ready to challenge erroneous court findings. The legal 
system therefore has an important broader interest in 
establishing scientific facts accurately beyond doing justice in 
the individual case.  
  
 13 See Gregory S. Alexander, The Application and Avoidance of Foreign Law 
in the Law of Conflicts, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 602, 603-04, 630-31 (1975) (noting that 
judges are far more likely to be ignorant of foreign law and lack the context necessary 
to interpret new provisions). 
 14 See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION (1985) 61-67 (describing the idea of “legal science” in German jurisprudence 
and how it sharply diverges from American legal realism). 
 15 To be perfectly precise, the term “scientific facts” here does not include 
individual applications of science, which are case-specific and far more like ordinary 
adjudicative facts. See, e.g., In re UNISYS Sav. Plan Litig., 173 F.3d 145, 161 (3d Cir. 
1999) (Becker, C.J., dissenting) (drawing a distinction between general methodology 
questions which are for the judge, and questions about the reliability of a specific 
expert witness, which are for the jury). 
 16 See supra note 15. 
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C. Finding a Home for Scientific Evidence 
Given the problems with the factual regime, one option 
is to treat scientific evidence as akin to law, along the lines of 
Monahan and Walker.17 Here, however, the fit remains 
problematic. The proof process for law is relaxed precisely 
because judges are assumed to be well-versed and experienced 
in interpreting the laws of their home jurisdiction. Yet, judges 
rarely if ever will have such a high comfort level with scientific 
issues.18  
But if scientific evidence is neither fish nor fowl, how 
should we handle it? The standard response for a law review 
article is to propose some kind of third, hybrid category. The 
proposal in turn prompts the reader to roll her eyes, and 
rightly so—after all, the whole point of a dichotomy is to make 
rough divisions, and adding a third or fourth classification is 
rarely justified. But in this case, there actually already exists 
such a hybrid category, and it is the one for foreign law.  
Foreign law and scientific facts are neither law nor fact 
for roughly the same reasons. Approaching them as factual 
questions neglects their status as generalized inquiries subject 
to external verification. Approaching them as legal questions 
ignores judges’ profound lack of expertise and experience in the 
substantive areas. Both inquiries thus fall into a no-man’s land 
between law and fact. Indeed, they are so similar that the 
governing doctrines should arguably cohere.  
The good news is that conflicts-of-law scholars have 
grappled with the problem of proving foreign law for some 
time. Indeed, the poor fit between the law-fact dichotomy and 
foreign law questions has borne itself out in actual doctrinal 
wrangling. At common law and historically in the federal 
courts, questions of foreign law were treated as questions of 
fact so that pleading requirements, the rules of evidence, and 
  
 17 Monahan & Walker, supra note 10, at 488.  
 18 For example, consider Judge Kozinski’s reaction to the Supreme Court’s 
Daubert decision:  
As we read the Supreme Court’s teaching in Daubert, therefore, though we 
are largely untrained in science and certainly no match for any of the 
witnesses whose testimony we are reviewing, it is our responsibility to 
determine whether those experts’ proposed testimony amounts to “scientific 
knowledge,” constitutes “good science,” and was “derived by the scientific 
method.” . . . Mindful of our position in the hierarchy of the federal judiciary, 
we take a deep breath and proceed with this heady task. 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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adversarial values all applied.19 Yet, in 1966, Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 44.1 did the unthinkable—it recharacterized 
foreign law as a question of law, opening the door to de novo 
appellate review and independent judicial investigations.20  
Courts have arguably never fully adopted the fact or law 
framework exclusively. Instead, the regime governing foreign 
law questions often ends up as a hybrid, mixing and matching 
procedures and requirements from both categories of proof. For 
example, despite defining foreign law to be a question of law, 
federal courts have effectively held that a failure to provide 
sufficient evidence of foreign law remains a valid ground for 
dismissal.21 Along similar lines, while federal appellate courts 
have outwardly encouraged judges to do independent research 
on foreign law,22 in practice, judges remain reluctant,23 and 
perhaps more tellingly, rely substantially on experts, 
something they would almost never do for domestic law. 
Such hybridization also appears outside the federal 
context. Texas has “a hybrid rule by which the presentation of 
the foreign law to the court resembles the presentment of 
evidence but which ultimately is decided as a question of law.”24 
Other states handle foreign law questions primarily through 
judicial notice,25 but as one leading casebook observes, for cases 
involving “foreign legal system[s] . . . alien in language and 
structure,” courts will often rely heavily on party presentation 
and decline to do independent research (evoking “fact”), yet 
  
 19 Arthur R. Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the “Fact” Approach to 
Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 613, 
617-24 (1967) (describing the process of finding foreign law at common law).  
 20 FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 & advisory committee’s notes; see also TEX. R. EVID. 
203. But see Griffin v. Mark Travel Corp., 724 N.W.2d 900, 902 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) 
(noting that Wisconsin maintains the common law classification of foreign law as fact); 
Amsellem v. Amsellem, 730 N.Y.S.2d 212, 215 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001) (holding that “the 
interpretation of French law is an issue of fact that can be resolved at trial”). 
 21 See Esso Standard Oil S.A. v. S.S. Gasbras Sul, 387 F.2d 573, 581 (2d Cir. 
1967) (holding that plaintiff “failed in its burden of proof” regarding foreign law and 
that even under Rule 44.1, plaintiff failed to show “it ha[d] a good cause of action”), 
cited in Adams v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., No. 92-35028 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 25448, at 
*7-8 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 1993) (unpublished opinion) (noting that although “there is no 
‘burden of proof’ in the evidentiary sense with respect to foreign law . . . the plaintiff 
who pleads foreign law still must successfully persuade the court that he has a good 
cause of action”). 
 22 See Twohy v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 758 F.2d 1185, 1193 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 23 RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 73 (6th ed. 1998).  
 24 See, e.g., Long Distance Int’l, Inc. v. Telefonos de Mex., 49 S.W.3d 347, 351 
(Tex. 2001) (discussing TEX. R. EVID. 203). 
 25 E.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4511 (2007). 
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dispense with the ordinarily restrictive rules of evidence 
(evoking “law”).26  
The regimes for handling foreign law are by no means 
uniform: the particular breed of hybridization differs from one 
jurisdiction to another.27 Considered together, however, they 
offer a new perspective on the proof of scientific evidence, and 
implicitly suggest some avenues for reform. The next Part 
draws out some of these implications.  
III. APPLYING THE FOREIGN LAW MODEL 
What would be the ramifications of imposing a foreign 
law model on scientific evidence? To get a sense, this Part maps 
some of the more fundamental features of a typical foreign law 
framework onto the scientific evidence context. In the abstract, 
some of the resulting proof requirements and procedures may 
appear a bit radical, but a closer look shows them to be 
sensible, and in some cases, not all that different from judges’ 
natural inclinations. 
A. Proof at Trial 
A hybrid treatment of scientific facts would undoubtedly 
result in important changes to the process of proof at trial. For 
example, one of the key changes that arose when foreign law 
shifted from a fact to a law regime was the relaxation of the 
focus on oral presentation of evidence. The move to a law 
regime also affected the applicability of the rules of evidence, 
judicial notice, and pleading requirements.28 
1. Oral Presentation 
Whatever can be said about the merits of conventional 
direct and cross examination, they almost certainly do not 
  
 26 SCHLESINGER, supra note 23, at 69. 
 27 Id. at 95-98 (surveying the states and concluding that a plurality follow 
FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1, but that a significant number adopt some type of judicial notice 
approach, and a small minority continue to treat foreign law as fact). 
 28 E.g., FED R. CIV. P. 44.1 (“In determining foreign law, the court may 
consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not 
submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.”); TEX. R. 
EVID. 203 (“The court, in determining the law of a foreign nation, may consider any 
material or source, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the rules 
of evidence, including but not limited to affidavits, testimony, briefs, and treatises.”). 
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apply to scientific questions.29 Consider how good instructors 
and researchers generally convey new scientific ideas. Ideas 
are developed through a (hopefully) carefully constructed 
lecture in which background concepts build up to a main 
thesis.30 And as any veteran of a science course knows, sound 
understanding of that lecture almost always requires lengthy 
and prior preparation with reading materials.31 This recipe 
undoubtedly continues to hold true in the courtroom, where 
cases often turn on a stack of scientific articles (or lack thereof). 
The choppy back-and-forth of ordinary courtroom testimony is 
suboptimal and confusing, and knowledgeable experts 
unfamiliar with legal examination methods become easily 
derailed by the attorneys.  
2. Rules of Evidence 
The applicability of the rules of evidence also changes 
considerably for the better. One of the biggest weapons in the 
rules of evidence is the hearsay rule, which requires that 
witnesses testify only about matters for which they have 
personal knowledge. Scientific witnesses will almost never 
satisfy the rule, since science is a collaborative process, taking 
place over considerable distances and time. Expert testimony 
rules, of course, create sizable exceptions to the hearsay rule, 
allowing witnesses to use inadmissible evidence for the purpose 
of reaching their conclusions,32 but the strong presumption is 
  
 29 See Harold L. Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1080, 1086 (1966) (“The larger issue, beyond criticism of obstacles to expert 
testimony, is whether oral communication is at all conducive to correct determination 
of complicated scientific and technological issues.”). 
 30 Indeed, the use of mini-lectures to juries has become increasingly common 
in scientific cases. See, e.g., Marvin J. Garbis, Aussie Inspired Musings on 
Technological Issues—Of Kangaroo Courts, Tutorials & Hot Tub Cross-Examination, 6 
GREEN BAG 141, 144 & n.16 (2003) (recounting a federal patent trial in which the judge 
had considered having a “tutorial expert . . . give[] the jury an introductory tutorial 
lecture”). 
 31 See, e.g., State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 6 (Alaska 1978) (questioning, in a 
case involving cocaine’s proper classification, whether a hearing would provide better 
evidence than looking at briefs and judicial research); Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman 
Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1152-53 (2001) 
(discussing psychological studies showing that jurors who receive summaries of expert 
testimony “were more likely to make clear distinctions . . . and recall more trial-
relevant information”). 
 32 FED. R. EVID. 703 (“If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data 
need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be 
admitted.”). 
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that these bases are never revealed to the factfinder.33 Even 
under the learned treatises exception to the hearsay rule, 
scientific journal articles “may [only] be read into evidence but 
may not be received as exhibits.”34 The end result is that jurors 
are structurally prevented from grappling with the basis of an 
expert’s opinion, forcing them to either believe the expert or 
not. This “deference” model35 of expert testimony is rife with 
danger, particularly since relying on traditional cues for 
assessing witness credibility is not necessarily a sound method 
for assessing scientific experts.36 Furthermore, there is almost 
no reason to judge scientific facts upon the idiosyncrasies of a 
particular scientist. Unlike with traditional facts, in which 
eyewitnesses are not generally fungible, with scientific facts 
the witnesses typically are. The expert is a synthesizer of vast 
quantities of information, and it is the information and not the 
expert that ideally should be the focus of the inquiry. 
3. Judicial Notice 
For similar reasons, judicial notice practice also 
improves. For adjudicative facts, judicial notice involves an 
extremely high bar. Words like “indisputable,” or “beyond 
controversy” litter the landscape, discouraging parties and 
courts from deviating from the ordinary presentation of 
  
 33 FED. R. EVID. 703 (“Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not 
be disclosed to the jury . . . unless the court determines that their probative value in 
assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their 
prejudicial effect.”). 
 34 FED. R. EVID.803(18). The federal version of the learned treatises exception 
is in fact liberal when compared to some state schemes. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. § 1341 
(creating hearsay exception only for “books of science . . . made by persons indifferent 
between the parties . . . when offered to prove facts of general notoriety and interest”); 
Glenn Koppel, Re: Scientific Evidence as Hearsay, Evidence Listserv Discussion, Feb. 
24, 2010 (on file with author) (discussing the narrowness of the California exception).  
 35 Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: 
Deference or Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131, 1133 (1993). 
 36 But see Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovi & Valerie P. Hans, Jurors’ Evaluations of 
Expert Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 441 
(2003) (presenting research showing that jurors “consider both the messenger and the 
message in the course of evaluating the expert’s credibility”); Daniel W. Schuman & 
Anthony Champagne, Removing the People From the Legal Process: The Rhetoric and 
Research on Judicial Selection and Juries, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 242, 253-54 
(1997) (reporting research suggesting that jurors evaluate experts based on “a very 
sensible set of considerations—the expert’s qualifications, reasoning, factual 
familiarity, and impartiality,” and that they “attempt to go beyond superficial 
considerations”). 
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evidence.37 For questions of foreign law, however, the strictures 
become considerably more relaxed, a state-of-affairs that 
arguably better suits scientific evidence. Since scientific facts 
are generalized facts, the court can afford to be more 
inquisitive, and judicial notice need not demand iron-clad 
evidence. 
4. Pleading 
Finally, the hybrid model for foreign law retains (at 
least in spirit) the pleading requirements from the fact regime. 
As previously noted, failure to provide evidence of foreign law 
therefore can provide grounds for dismissal. Retaining these 
pleading requirements in the scientific context seems similarly 
sensible. When dealing with the law of the forum, extensive 
pleading is not required because everyone is presumed to have 
access to the governing law, and because the court has both 
expertise and comprehensive research mechanisms at its 
disposal. This is of course not true for scientific facts. Placing 
burdens on the moving party thus seems eminently 
reasonable.38  
B. Seeking Information Beyond the Parties 
The aforementioned changes to the proof process may be 
the more fundamental implications of imposing a foreign law 
model on scientific facts, but perhaps the more exciting ones 
are the inquisitorial mechanisms that the foreign law model 
suggests. In ascertaining the foreign law applicable to a case, 
some courts have demonstrated the power of independent 
judicial research, court-appointed experts, and external 
institutions. To be sure, some judges still resist using these 
mechanisms because they run sharply against adversarial 
  
 37 FED. R. EVID. 201 (“A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to 
reasonable dispute . . . .”); FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s notes (noting that for 
adjudicative facts, “[a] high degree of indisputability is the essential prerequisite”). 
 38 My embrace of a conventional pleading regime for scientific facts may 
initially appear in tension with Margaret Berger’s well-known proposal to dispense 
with proof of general causation in toxic tort cases. See Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. 
Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed Choice: Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
257 (2005); Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New 
Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (1997). Margaret’s thesis, 
however, is a substantive one—namely that tort law should rethink its focus on 
causation and refocus on things like culpability and failures to test. My focus, in 
contrast, is on the process of proof presuming no change in the substantive law. 
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norms, but their explicit recognition in the foreign law context 
has promoted greater acceptance, a process that could improve 
how courts handle scientific evidence. 
1. Court-Appointed Experts 
Court-appointed experts are perhaps the most modest 
suggestion to come from the foreign law hybrid model. The 
Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly discuss and allow the use 
of court-appointed experts in scientific evidence cases.39 Some 
courts have used them over the years,40 and the Federal 
Judicial Center has published material describing, facilitating, 
and encouraging their use.41 Indeed, even Justice Breyer, 
writing in Joiner v. General Electric Co. managed to make a 
pitch.42 
That said, the reality on the ground is that court-
appointed experts are rarely used.43 For some judges, the idea 
of a neutral expert is anathema, whether because it is 
inconsistent with the adversarial process, or because it smacks 
too much of judicial abdication. But for most, the difficulties of 
finding, funding, and accommodating a court-appointed expert 
are simply not worth the perceived benefits, so trudge on the 
judge (or jury) must. An added endorsement from the hybrid 
model, however, may be a welcome boost of legitimacy, 
encouraging judges to do more along these lines. 
  
 39 FED. R. EVID. 706; see also Andrew MacGregor Smith, Note, Using 
Impartial Experts in Valuations: A Forum-Specific Approach, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1241, 1268 & n.134 (1994) (cataloging states with evidence provisions similar to Rule 
706). 
 40 See, e.g., Debra L. Worthington et al., Hindsight Bias, Daubert, and the 
Silicone Breast Implant Litigation, 8 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 154, 162 (2002) (listing 
several high-profile examples, including the breast implant, DES, asbestos, and 
Parlodel litigations). 
 41 E.g., JOE S. CECIL & THOMAS E. WILLGING, COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS: 
DEFINING THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 706 
(1993); Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a 
Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 
1004-05 tbl.1 (1994). 
 42 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149-50 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(discussing the use of court-appointed experts, “special masters and specially trained 
law clerks” as helpful mechanisms in science-related cases). 
 43 DAVID H. KAYE, ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE, 
Scientific Evidence § 10.4.1, at 348; Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WISC. L. 
REV. 1113, 1191 (1991). 
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2. Independent Judicial Research 
The next level of reform deals with independent judicial 
investigations. Beyond considering party-provided information 
and arguments, judges handling questions of law may 
generally conduct independent research. As previously noted, a 
motivation for this exception to the usual rule against ex parte 
behavior is that courts should correctly apply legal rules 
regardless of the parties’ positions, especially since those 
decisions will become precedents in future cases. Even for core 
legal questions this practice has its detractors,44 but it is 
reasonably well accepted. 
Independent judicial research can be quite useful for 
judges attempting to understand scientific testimony as well. 
Party testimony in this sphere tends to become a battle of the 
experts with the court placed in the unenviable position of 
mediating between two or more well-credentialed scientists.45 
In this context, the natural inclination of any beleaguered 
decisionmaker is to do independent library research on his 
own. I have argued elsewhere that this practice is both 
legitimate and desirable, despite the obvious sacrifice to 
adversarial norms.46 The judges themselves, however, are 
evenly split,47 although moving to a hybrid model may 
legitimate the practice as it has in the foreign law context. 
3. External Institutions 
Perhaps the most radical reform suggested by the 
foreign law model is the use of an external institution with 
greater expertise for determining scientific facts. In the foreign 
law context, this general idea surfaces in the use of 
comparative law research centers and certification procedures. 
For example, in Germany and France, courts have historically 
used comparative law centers, notably the Max Planck 
Institute for Foreign and International Private Law and the 
  
 44 See, e.g., Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look 
at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245 (2002). 
 45 The classic articulation of this problem is found in Learned Hand, 
Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 
40 (1901). As Judge Hand asks, “how can the jury judge between two statements each 
founded upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to their own? It is just because 
they are incompetent for such a task that the expert is necessary at all.” Id. at 54. 
 46 Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert Age, 56 
DUKE L.J. 1263, 1274-75 (2007). 
 47 Id. at 1276-77 & figs.1 & 2. 
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French Center of Comparative Law, to gather information on 
“unfamiliar foreign laws.”48 Somewhat analogously, federal 
courts, when confronted with ambiguous substantive issues of 
state law under diversity, often certify such questions to state 
supreme courts.49  
Concededly, no such procedures appear to exist in 
American courts for gathering information about foreign law. 
Use of comparative law centers is a European phenomenon, 
whereas certification surfaces only with regard to state law 
issues under Erie.50 Yet, on a conceptual level, the procedures 
seem eminently sensible. If a court faces a difficult or 
ambiguous question of foreign law and is at a loss as to how to 
resolve it, whom better to ask than a foreign court?51  
The analog to these mechanisms in the scientific 
evidence context is to certify questions to relevant scientific 
bodies asking for advice. Clearly the context is not exactly the 
same, since a foreign or state supreme court has conclusive 
authority to declare the rule for its jurisdiction, whereas 
scientific bodies obviously do not. Nonetheless, an opinion on 
the state of science from, for example, the National Research 
Council of the National Academy of Sciences, can be extremely 
helpful, if not de facto conclusive in resolving scientific 
questions in court.52  
One charge against such certification is its lack of 
democratic accountability, and that may indeed be a serious 
cost of the practice. However, as a practical matter, previous 
reports by the National Academy of Sciences on scientific 
matters with legal import have been well received and 
influential in legal circles. The most famous instance is 
  
 48 Alexander, supra note 13, at 637 & n.157. 
 49 Doug M. Keller, Note, Interpreting Foreign Law Through an Erie Lens: A 
Critical Look at United States v. McNab, 40 Tex. Int’l L.J. 157, 178 & n.203 (2004) 
(discussing certification); Geri J. Yonover, A Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reining in the Use of 
Certification, 47 ARK. L. REV. 305, 313-17 (1994) (discussing the history of certification 
and finding certification statutes among the majority of states). 
 50 Keller, supra note 49, at 183 & n.253 (reporting that there is currently “no 
procedure by which federal courts can certify a difficult foreign legal question to the 
relevant foreign court,” except for Puerto Rico, which is “clearly a unique situation”). 
 51 Id. at 184-85 (proposing the application of Erie-type procedures to the 
foreign law context). 
 52 See generally D.H. Kaye, The NRC Bullet-Lead Report: Should Science 
Committee Make Legal Findings?, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 91, 104-05 (2005) (raising the 
question whether science committees like the National Academies should make legal 
determinations in addition to scientific findings). 
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perhaps the DNA study,53 but more recent panels on lead bullet 
analysis54 and the like have been similarly successful.55 All of 
these previous reports have arisen independent of any formal 
judicial request or funding, but one wonders if a more formal 
link could prove beneficial for both sides.56  
C. Decisionmakers 
The last area in which the foreign law model might offer 
suggestions for scientific evidence inquiries is in the 
decisionmaking process itself. Under a foreign-law-as-fact 
framework, the jury was the finder of foreign law, and 
appellate courts reviewed these decisions with a high level of 
deference. With the shift to a more law-oriented framework, 
foreign law became the province of the judge and was reviewed 
de novo on appeal. 
1. Factfinder 
Scientific evidence as it currently stands already 
occupies the middle ground in terms of decisionmaker. 
Nominally, scientific facts are facts for the jury. Daubert is 
merely a reliability screen, no different than other 
admissibility inquiries under the rules of evidence. But in 
practice, as everyone knows, Daubert has had monumental 
significance on the way litigants prove scientific facts in court. 
After all, excluding an opponent’s scientific expert effectively 
negates his ability to present any scientific evidence at all, and 
thus cases often live and die at Daubert hearings.57 
  
 53 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 
(1996); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992). 
 54 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FORENSIC ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD 
EVIDENCE (2004). 
 55 Perhaps the most ambitious project of all has been the recent National 
Research Council report on forensic science, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN 
THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009). Its impact still remains to be seen. 
 56 My conversations with Margaret, who has of course served on some of 
these efforts, suggests that they are exceptionally expensive and impractical for all but 
the most controversial and pressing problems. One wonders, however, if perhaps less 
expensive versions could be similarly organized. 
 57 David G. Owen, A Decade of Daubert, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 345, 362 n.115 
(2002) (quoting D. Alan Rudlin, The Judge as Gatekeeper: What Hath Daubert-Joiner-
Kumho Wrought?, 29 PRODUCT SAFETY & LIABILITY REP. 329, 336 (2001) (“[T]he 
Daubert hearing and ruling have effectively become virtually as case outcome 
determinative as a class certification hearing and ruling: once decided, a case either 
shrivels up and goes away, or becomes more dangerous to try.”). 
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Adopting the foreign law model may therefore involve a 
change in factfinder that is more significant from a formal 
standpoint than a practical one. For all intents and purposes, 
judges have already claimed a lion’s share of the scientific 
factfinding process. Undoubtedly, however, adopting the 
foreign law model would complete the transformation and give 
it greater transparency. 
2. Appellate Review 
At present, federal appellate courts review scientific 
reliability determinations under Daubert only for abuse of 
discretion.58 The application of an abuse-of-discretion standard 
is perfectly in line with appellate review standards for other 
evidentiary rulings, but critically misses the generality that 
distinguishes scientific from ordinary adjudicative facts. The 
current Joiner doctrine contemplates having one case find a 
scientific or forensic method sufficiently reliable to be 
admissible, while a second case does not. The problem is that 
there can be only one right answer, and precedent should 
reflect that.59 
Again, shifting to a foreign law model would help 
legitimate a change to de novo review, which would have 
appellate courts perform their established role in ensuring 
uniformity and consistency among lower courts. Deferential 
review is well-established for facts and the evidentiary rules 
that govern them. By converting the proof of scientific facts 
into a more law-like hybrid, the benefits of de novo review 
become more obvious, increasing the feasibility of such a shift. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The foreign law model offers a third option beyond the 
conventional law-fact distinction for handling the proof of 
scientific facts. The problems of proving foreign law and 
proving scientific facts are sufficiently close that the relatively 
modern scientific evidence field can take advantage of the 
  
 58 Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 59 My co-authors and I argue precisely along these lines in our treatise, and 
as it happens, many courts have seemingly distinguished case-specific scientific 
evidence, which should be reviewed deferentially, from “trans-case scientific issues,” 
which should be reviewed de novo. Joiner, however, draws no such distinction, making 
it problematic and in need of additional sharpening. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1:34, at 100-03 & n.17 (2009). 
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wisdom developed over the years by conflicts scholars. In its 
strong form, the foreign law model provides a specific, concrete 
model for reform in scientific evidence. But even in its weak 
form, the linking of foreign law and scientific evidence is a 
useful thought experiment that provides a launching point for 
discussion on how we might rethink the process of proof in 
scientific cases.60 
A final matter worth acknowledging is the obstacles a 
hybrid vision for scientific evidence might encounter. 
Doctrinally, the most serious barriers are probably the 
constitutional ones. The Seventh Amendment guarantee of jury 
trials, for example, poses problems for the move to a judicial 
factfinder. One response might be to revisit the arguments in 
support of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1’s 
constitutionality,61 but those arguments are far less persuasive 
in the scientific evidence context, if for no other reason than 
that scientific facts are still “facts” by any common 
understanding, and no amount of doublespeak will turn them 
into “law.” Consequently, any practical reform may need to 
perpetuate a Daubert structure in which the jury remains the 
nominal factfinder, even if it features high levels of judicial 
supervision. 
Along more cultural lines, as Sam Gross and others 
have argued, given our adversarial traditions, the legal system 
often resists and ignores inquisitorial reforms.62 Advocating for 
each of these reforms in isolation may therefore be too much to 
ask. However, one way to combat cultural resistance is to start 
with practices with which judges are familiar and comfortable, 
and then expand them gradually. For example, Daubert itself is 
somewhat inquisitorial in flavor, since it sharply chastens the 
conventional, adversarial presentation of expert evidence by 
imposing a judicial gatekeeper. Daubert has become widely 
adopted beyond the federal system and has unquestionably 
  
 60 This more chastened view may be the more realistic one, since the problem 
of proving foreign law is not without continuing difficulties. See Alexander, supra note 
13, at 630 (suggesting that both common law and civil law methods of proving foreign 
law have been similarly “ineffective”). 
 61 Miller, supra note 19, at 684-88 (discussing various reasons why foreign 
law, although a question of fact at common law, may not require jury determination 
under the Seventh Amendment); see also Note, Proof of the Law of Foreign Countries: 
Appellate Review and Subsequent Litigation, 72 HARV. L. REV. 318, 322 n.38 (1958) 
(“[I]t is arguable that since foreign law was decided by a jury at common law, a federal 
court is bound by the seventh amendment to give the question to the jury and exercise 
a narrow scope of review.” (citation omitted)). 
 62 Cheng, supra note 46, at 1303; Gross, supra note 43, at 1197-98. 
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influenced the way judges (and evidence scholars) think about 
scientific evidence. What explains its success? Certainly being 
a Supreme Court edict helped, but the genius of Daubert was 
framing the reform of scientific evidence as an admissibility 
problem. Judges are comfortable making admissibility 
decisions; Daubert is only a modest extension.  
If judges have (or will) become accustomed to the Rule 
44.1 framework for handling foreign law, then shifting 
scientific evidence questions into this hybrid regime could be 
more successful than adopting the reforms piecemeal. Lawyers 
are creatures of analogy, and once comfortable with Rule 44.1, 
extending it to scientific evidence may only require a minor 
mental shift. 
* * * 
Two aspects of Margaret’s scholarship and approach to 
evidence have always struck me as important guideposts for 
future generations of evidence scholars. One is aspirational, 
the other cautionary.  
The aspirational thread is that in thinking about 
evidence and proof, one should avoid tunnel vision and 
confining oneself exclusively to the “Rules.” No article better 
demonstrates the rewards of this kind of “outside-the-box” 
thinking than Margaret’s 1997 article on eliminating general 
causation.63 Proving causation in toxic tort cases is often a 
remarkably difficult task from an evidentiary standpoint, 
resulting in unnecessary social costs.64 Margaret’s solution to 
the problem, however, is not endless tweaking of the 
evidentiary doctrines, but rather considering new tort 
perspectives and changing the substantive tort requirements.65 
The cautionary thread is simply that scientific evidence 
problems are, as Margaret likes to say, “very difficult.” The 
problems of expert evidence have plagued courts for over two 
centuries,66 and while as academics we are preternaturally 
disposed to elegant and grand solutions, those solutions are 
unlikely to work out. Real life is too messy, and in this 
business, silver bullets are few and far between. Change and 
improvement will realistically arise through accretion, not 
revolution. 
  
 63 Berger, supra note 38. 
 64 Id. at 2118, 2122-31. 
 65 Id. at 2152. 
 66 TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE: THE HISTORY OF 
SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 4 (2004). 
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My hope is that linking scientific evidence with foreign 
law pays tribute to both these nuggets of wisdom distilled from 
Margaret’s long and distinguished career. On the first score, 
the link blends evidence law with comparative law, two fields 
so disparate that I dare say they share few if any scholars in 
common. On the second, by hewing closely to well-established 
precedents in the conflicts field and using modest analogies to 
port them over to scientific evidence, the proposal eschews the 
grand “solution” in favor of the messier but more gradual and 
flexible “approach.”  
Of course, none of this is to say that Margaret will not 
have her doubts about my crazy idea, but I would not have it 
any other way. 
